Basic mathematical knowledge
The course consists of four chapters:
Requirements for the assignment of ECTS Credits and Grades
Exam (120 min)
The students know basic mathematical concepts of analysis and linear algebra. They can interpret mathematical formulas that are written in the condensed mathematical syntax. The students understand the concept of a proof and can develop rigorous mathematical proofs in a elementary level. They understand abstract mathematical concepts like metric spaces and linear spaces and are able to comprehend argumentation on basis of abstract mathematical concepts. They are able to apply their knowledge; especially they are familiar with the calculation of limits and derivatives, the methods of linear algebra, and they can solve nonlinear optimization problems. The students are able to communicate their mathematical knowledge in English.
Teaching Assistants
Exercise Session 1
Tutor: Thi Anh Dam
Time: from 13.45 to 15:15
Supporter: Giovanni Ballarin
Exercise Session 2
Tutor: Giovanni Ballarin
Time: from 15:30 to 17:00
Supporter: Dam Thi Anh
Lecture | |||||||
Lecture | 07.09.20 – 01.10.20 | Monday – Thursday | 10:15 – 11:45 | online | |||
Exam | 08.10.20 | Thursday | 08:00 – 10:00 | 001. A (A 3 Bibl.,Hörsaalgebäude) | |||
Retake Exam | 03.12.20 | Thursday | 14:00 – 16:00 | O 148 | |||
Tutorial | |||||||
Session 1 – Tutor: Dam | 07.09.20 – 01.10.20 | Monday – Thursday | 13:45 – 15:15 | online | |||
Session 2 – Tutor: Ballarin | 07.09.20 – 01.10.20 | Monday – Thursday | 15:30 – 17:00 | online | |||
Prerequisites
E700
Requirements for the assignment of ECTS-Credits and Grades
The course gives a foundation for studies in microeconomics at the Ph.D. level. The first part is devoted to decision theory. It is organized as follows:
1. Choice, preferences and utility
2. Choice under uncertainty: Expected utility
3. Utility for money
4. Behavioral models of choice under uncertainty
The second part covers game theory and is organized as follows:
5. Static games of complete information: Rationalizability and iterated strict dominance
6. Static games of complete information: Nash equilibrium
7. Static games of incomplete information
8. Dynamic games: The extensive form
9. Dynamic games: Equilibrium concepts
The students will acquire the basic tools for graduate-level microeconomic analysis. They will learn how to model decision-making and strategic interactions. They will acquire important mathematical skills used in decision theory and game theory. They will be able to apply that theory to their own research and to read recent developments in the field. The concepts learned in the course serve as building blocks for more advanced topics such as the ones covered in Advanced Microeconomics II and III, and also for macroeconomics and empirical economics. Students also learn how to write rigorous formal proofs to address microeconomic questions.
Textbook references
Contact Information
Nicolas Schutz; Phone: (0621) 181 1872; email: schutz@uni-mannheim.de, Office: 3–10, Office hours: by appointment.
Teaching Assistant
Lecture | |||||||
Lecture | 12.10.20 – 07.12.20 | Monday | 10:15 – 11:45 | online | |||
Lecture | 14.10.20 – 09.12.20 | Wednesday | 10:15 – 11:45 | online | |||
Exam | 11.12.20 | Friday | 00:00 – 00:00 | tba | |||
Retake exam | 25.01.21 | Monday | 13:30 – 15:30 | online | |||
Tutorial | |||||||
Tutorial | 12.10.20 – 07.12.20 | Monday | 13:45 – 15:15 | online | |||
Tutorial | 14.10.20 – 09.12.20 | Wednesday | 13:45 – 15:15 | online | |||
E700
Goals and Contents of the Module:
This course provides an introduction to the foundations of modern macroeconomic analysis. The main object of this course will be structural dynamic models where households' preference, firms' technology, and market structure are explicitly specified. The behaviors of agents in the model economy are derived based on microeconomic foundations. The macroeconomic aggregates are then determined by aggregating individuals' micro-founded decisions. We will consider some applications as well.
Requirements for the assignment of ECTS credits and grades:
Literature:
Expected Competences acquired after Completion of the Module:
At the end of the semester, students are expected to be familiar with the basic methodology such as recursive methods and dynamic programming as well as the basic macroeconomic models.
Teaching Assistant
Lecture | |||||||
Lecture | 13.10.20 – 08.12.20 | Tuesday | 15:30 – 17:00 | online | |||
Lecture | 14.10.20 – 09.12.20 | Wednesday | 15:30 – 17:00 | online | |||
Exam | 17.12.20 | Thursday | 00:00 – 00:00 | tba | |||
Retake exam | 28.01.21 | Thursday | 14:00 – 16:00 | online | |||
Tutorial | |||||||
Tutorial | 13.10.20 – 08.12.20 | Tuesday | 13:45 – 15:15 | online | |||
Tutorial | 16.10.20 – 11.12.20 | Friday | 10:15 – 11:45 | online | |||
E700
The goal of the module is to offer advanced treatment to econometric theory and to serve as the gateway to further advanced theoretical and applied econometric modules offered in the economics graduate program at the Department of Economics in Mannheim.
In the module an introduction will be given to the probabilistic framework of econometric theory.
In the first part, basic notions of probability theory with their measure theoretical background are explained: probability measure, random variables, expectations, conditional expectations, notions of convergence and basic limit theorems.
The second part will be devoted to the formal derivation of theoretical foundations of linear regression models. The theory of the first part is then applied to obtain asymptotic properties of parameter estimators and to set up statistical tests in this framework.
The module gives training in the use of mathematical arguments in the theory of asymptotic econometrics.
Requirements for the Assignment of ECTS Credits and Grades:
written exam, 120 min,
regular attendance required
Literature:
On successful completion of the module, students are expected to attain the following competences:
Teaching Assistant
Lecture | |||||||
Lecture | 13.10.20 – 08.12.20 | Tuesday | 10:15 – 11:45 | via Zoom | |||
Lecture | 15.10.20 – 10.12.20 | Thursday | 10:15 – 11:45 | via Zoom | |||
Exam | 22.12.20 | Tuesday | 00:00 – 00:00 | tba | |||
Retake exam | 01.02.21 | Monday | 13:00 – 15:00 | online | |||
Tutorial | |||||||
Tutorial | 16.10.20 – 11.12.20 | Friday | 08:30 – 10:00 | online | |||
2nd and higher year Ph.D. students from the Center for Doctoral Studies in Economics (CDSE)
2nd year students from the Master of Economic Research
Method (hours per week): Colloquium (2 h)
Duration of the module: 4 semesters
ECTs awarded after each semester: 3 ECTs
Seminar | |||||||
Seminar | 08.09.20 – 08.12.20 | Tuesday | 15:30 – 17:00 | online |
Prerequisites: E700-E703, E801-E806
Lecture | |||||||
Lecture | 01.10.20 – 10.12.20 | Thursday | 13:45 – 17:00 | online | |||
Presentations
Students will read, present and discuss papers in environmental economics.
Lecture | |||||||
Lecture | 07.09.20 – 30.11.20 | Monday, every 2 weeks | 13:45 – 15:15 | online | |||
This seminar provides a forum for internal and external speakers to discuss their recent research in econometrics. Students working on either econometrics or an empirical project with a substantive econometric component are welcome to present. Please contact the instructor to set up a date.
Seminar | |||||||
Seminar | 10.09.20 – 10.12.20 | Thursday | 15:30 – 17:00 | online |
Formal: 2nd and higher year Ph.D. students from the Center for Doctoral Studies in Economics (CDSE).
2nd year students from the Master of Economic Research.
Course Content
Students are expected to gain knowledge on the frontier of modern quantitative macroeconomic research on growth and business cycles.
Requirements for the assignment of ECTS Credits and Grades
Students are expected to gain knowledge on the frontier of modern quantitative macroeconomic research on growth and business cycles.
Lecture | |||||||
Lecture | 07.09.20 – 07.12.20 | Monday | 13:45 – 15:15 | L7, S031 | |||
E700–703, E801–806
Course Content
This course covers both methods and applications in empirical macroeconomics. On the methodological side, we cover structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) models. The focus will be on various identification strategies (e.g., short-run/long-run restrictions, sign restrictions, external instruments), but also inference, factor models, nonlinear models. In addition, we discuss narrative approaches to identify structural shocks and univariate methods to study their propagation. The lectures and assignments introduce a range of applications. Those include the analysis of technology shocks, monetary policy shocks, and fiscal policy shocks.
Teaching Method
Lecture (2 SWS) and Exercise (1 SWS)
Requirements for the Assignment of ECTS Credits and Grades
A research paper and regular assignments.
Literature
Ramey (Handbook of Macroeconomics, 2016, Volume 2A, Chapter 2: Macroeconomic Shocks and Their Propagation)
Kilian and Lütkepohl (Structural Vector Autoregressive Analysis, 2017; see www-personal.umich.edu/~lkilian/book.html)
Lütkepohl (New Introduction to Multiple Time Series Analysis, 2005)
The course introduces students to econometric methods and macroeconomic applications with a focus on business cycles.
Lecture | |||||||
Lecture | 07.09.20 – 19.10.20 | Monday | 10:15 – 11:45 | L7, S031 | |||
Lecture | 07.09.20 – 14.09.20 | Monday | 17:15 – 18:45 | L9, 003 | |||
Lecture | 21.09.20 – 19.10.20 | Monday | 17:15 – 18:45 | L7, 001 | |||
Lecture | 14.12.20 | Monday | 08:30 – 18:30 | L7, S031 | |||
Prerequisites: E700-E703
Grading and ECTS credits: Exam + Assignments
The digital economy led to many new services where supply is matched with demand for various types of goods and services. More and more people and organizations are now in a position to design market rules that are being implemented in software. The design of markets is challenging as it needs to consider strategic behavior of market participants, psychological factors, and computational problems in order to implement the objectives of a designer. The recent years have led to many new insights and principles for the design of markets, which are beyond traditional economic theory. This course introduces the fundamentals of market design, an engineering field concerned with the design of real-world markets.
A. Matching Algorithms
Part A.1: introduction to matching markets and applications (school choice, kidney exchange, marriage and dating). Two sided matching problems (existence, lattice structure, different algorithms, expected ranking, number of stable marriages). Roommate problems (existence, Irving’s algorithm, expected ranking, number of stable marriages). Many to one matching.
Mandatory read before class: David Gale and Lloyd Shapley (1962), “College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage” American Mathematical Monthly, 69, 9–15.
Part A.2: Paths to stability. Rural hospital theorem. Tradeoffs between fairness and stability. Properties of large matching markets. Coupon collector problem. Unbalanced markets.
Mandatory reading before class: McVitie, David G., and Leslie B. Wilson. “Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets.” BIT Numerical Mathematics 10.3 (1970): 295–309.
Part A.3: Assignment problems. Random assignment. Competitive equilibrium with equal incomes and the Eisenberg-Gale program. Envy-freeness. House allocation and TTC.
Mandatory read before class: Hylland and Zeckhauser (1977) “The efficient allocation of individuals to positions.” Journal of Political Economy 87, 293–314.
Additional reading for Part A
Nikhil Agarwal, Itai Ashlagi, Eduardo Azevedo, Clayton R Featherstone, Ömer Karaduman. “Market failure in kidney exchange”. Forthcoming in the AER.
Ashlagi, Itai, and Alvin E. Roth. “Free riding and participation in large scale, multi‐hospital kidney exchange.” Theoretical Economics 9.3 (2014): 817–863.
Troyan, Peter, and Thayer Morrill. “Obvious Manipulations.” R&R at Journal of Economic Theory.
Abramitzky, Ran, Adeline Delavande, and Luis Vasconcelos. “Marrying up: the role of sex ratio in assortative matching.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 3.3 (2011): 124–57.
Ashlagi, Itai, Yash Kanoria, and Jacob D. Leshno. “Unbalanced random matching markets: The stark effect of competition.” Journal of Political Economy 125.1 (2017): 69–98.
Rastegari, B., Condon, A., Immorlica, N. and Leyton-Brown, K., 2013, June. Two-sided matching with partial information. In Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce (pp. 733–750). ACM.
Bogomolnaia, Anna, and Hervé Moulin. “Random matching under dichotomous preferences.” Econometrica 72.1 (2004): 257–279.
B. Auctions
Part B.1. Symmetric private value auctions. First-price auction. Second-price auction. Optimal-reserve prices. Revenue equivalence principle. Applications of the revenue equivalence Theorem.
Mandatory reading before class: Krishna, V. “Auction Theory”. Chapters 1 through 3.
Part B.2 Failures of the revenue equivalence principle. Risk averse bidders in first and second-price auctions. Bidders with budget constraints. Asymmetric bidders in first-price auctions.
Mandatory reading before class: Krishna, V. “Auction Theory”. Chapter 4.
Part B.3 Revelation principle. A generalized revenue equivalence theorem. Optimal auctions. Efficient auctions. Vickrey Clarke Groves mechanisms.
Mandatory reading before class: Krishna, V. “Auction Theory”. Chapter 5.
Additional reading for Part B.
Arozamena, L. and Cantillon, E. (2004): Investments Incentives in Procurement Auctions, Review of Economic Studies, 71, 1–18.
Bulow, J. and Klemperer, P. (1999): The Generalized War of Attrition, The American Economic Review, Vol. 89, No. 1, 175–189
Bulow, J. and Klemperer, P. Why do sellers (usually) prefer auctions? American Economic Review, 99(4):1544–75, 2009
Bulow, J. and Klemperer, P. (1996): Auctions versus Negotiations. The American Economic Review, Vol. 86, No.1, 180–194
Burguet, R. (2017) Procurement design with corruption. American Eco- nomic Journal: Microeconomics, 9(2):315–41
Myerson (1981), Optimal Auction Design, Mathematics of Operations Research 6, 58–73.
Shengwu Li. (2017) Obviously strategy-proof mechanisms. American Economic Review, 107(11):3257–87
After participating in the course, the participants understand methods and game-theoretical models of auctions as well as the fundamental problems in the design of matching markets. They are able to assess the properties of different auction formats and matching algorithms, and the results of theoretical and experimental analyses.
Contact Information: Gretschko, Vitali; vitali.gretschko
zew.deLecture | |||||||
Lecture | 08.09.20 – 08.12.20 | Tuesday | 12:00 – 13:30 | online | |||
Prerequisites: E700–703, E801–806
Requirements for the assignment of ECTS-Credits and Grades: One homework (40%), one research paper about a set of articles (40%), and a presentation (60 minutes) of this paper (20%).
The course teaches contract theory at the level of the research frontier. It reviews a number of classic topics in contract theory and puts them in an abstract general framework that makes it possible to understand the underlying common structure of these topics. All topics are from finance, but there are many links to other fields of economics. The course therefore also benefits doctoral students in finance and serves as a bridge between the two fields.
The main topics are:
1. Contracts and contingent markets, 2. Debt Contracts, 3. Hidden actions, 4. Incomplete contracts and renegotiation.
Students are supposed to understand the deep structure of hidden information, hidden actions, and unverifiability problems and the common features shared by these problems. They are able to master the complex technical difficulties arising in the formulation and solution of such problems and can use the tools of contract theory in their own research.
Students are able to read publications at the research frontier in information economics and contract theory in the fields of finance and related areas and to judge the conceptual value of the approaches taken in these papers. They can communicate their findings to other students and researchers by means of full academic presentation and in research-type articles. They can evaluate the relevance and correctness of technical arguments made in the literature and identify mistakes in publications. They are capable of assessing which arguments are novel and likely to generate intellectual progress, and which ones are just technical firework.
Lecture | |||||||
Lecture | 08.09.20 – 08.12.20 | Tuesday | 08:30 – 10:00 | L7, S031 | |||
Prerequisites: E700-E703, E801-E806
The course is an introduction to modern machine learning (ML) methods for economists. In particular, we will discuss methods from the world of supervised and unsupervised ML, with an emphasis on the challenges and opportunities of integrating these methods in empirical economics, and the relevance of ML to policy analysis and causal inference.
Upon course completion, students will be able to understand the idea behind modern machine learning methods, and both their advantages and disadvantages in the context of empirical economic research. They will also be able to apply these methods for their own project. In addition to that, students will acquire knowledge of theoretical foundations behind these methods.
Further information: A core reference for this course will be Hastie, Tibshirani & Friedman (2019), The Elements of Statistical Learning, Springer. Further references and journal articles will be announced in class.
Contact Information: Christoph Rothe; Phone: (0621) 181 1921; email: rothe@vwl.uni-mannheim.de, Office: 1.11, Office hours: by appointment
Lecture | |||||||
Lecture | 10.09.20 – 10.12.20 | Thursday | 08:30 – 10:00 | online | |||
Prerequisites: Students should expect to graduate within the next academic year.
This seminar introduces PhD students that expect to graduate within the next year to the academic job market for economists. Topics covered include (i) job prospects for academic economists, (ii) preparing applications, in particular the job market paper, (iii) interviewing for academic jobs, (iv) job talks and flyouts. Students will receive both general information and personalized guidance on these topics.
Upon course completion, students will be able to successfully navigate the job market for academic economists.
Contact Information: Christoph Rothe; Phone: (0621) 181 1921; email: rothe@vwl.uni-mannheim.de, Office: 1.11, Office hours: by appointment
The seminar will adapt to the interests of the participants as it is meant to help them start on their path to their own research. Participants will be asked to present their ideas and projects, which could be in a very preliminary state, as well as papers that relate to their ideas and projects. We will try and identify open research questions and empirical strategies that can answer these questions.
Seminar | |||||||
Seminar | 09.09.20 – 09.11.20 | Wednesday, every two weeks | 13:45 – 15:15 | online |
Prerequisites: E700-E703 or equivalent
Grading: One 120-minute written exam (100%)
This course is intended to be the first part of the PhD-level Public Economics sequence. The field is large, with significant theoretical and empirical components. It covers core ideas in the areas of market failures and public intervention, static and dynamic optimal taxation, social insurance and welfare, and state and local public finance. We will take a normative perspective, that is, we ask what an ideal state would do in order to achieve distributive objectives. The contents will be mostly theoretical, and the theoretical foundations will work as building blocks for empirical studies which will be covered in Public Economics II.
Part I: Market Failures and Public Intervention
Public Goods
Externalities
Asymmetric Information
Price vs. Quantity Regulations
Part II: Tax Theory
Introduction to Taxation / Tax Incidence
Optimal Commodity Taxation
Many-Person Ramsey Tax Rule
Production Efficiency Theorem
Non-linear (Mirrleesian) Taxation of Income
Richardian Equivalence
Tax Smoothing Problem
Optimal Taxation of Capital
New Dynamic Public Finance
Part III: Social Insurance and Welfare
Optimal Transfer Programs
Social Insurance Programs
Part IV: State and Local Public Finance
Local Public Goods
Property Taxation and Zoning
The course introduces the core topics in Public Economics. The course should prove useful for any student interested in analyzing policy issues.
Further information: Lecture notes will be provided.
Useful references:
Gruber, Public Finance and Public Policy, Worth Publishers, 2019
Atkinson and Stiglitz, Lectures on Public Economics, Mc Graw-Hill, 1980
Salanié, Microeconomics of market failures, MIT Press, 2010
Cornes and Sandler, The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods and Club Goods, Cambridge University Press, 2012
Salanié, The economics of taxation, MIT Press, 2011
Myles, Public Economics, Cambridge University Press, 1995
Mas-Collel, Whinston, Green, Microeconomic Theory, Harvard University Press, 1996
Stiglitz, Economics of the Public sector, 3rd Edition, 2000, Norton & Company
Hindriks and Myles, Intermediate Public Economics, MIT Press
Lecture | |||||||
Lecture | 07.09.20 – 09.11.20 | Montag | 08:30 – 10:00 | online | |||
Lecture | 09.09.20 – 11.11.20 | Wednesday | 08:30 – 10:00 | online | |||
Presentation (30 minutes, 50%), class participation (Q&A, constructive criticism of other presentations – 10%), seminar paper (40%).
During the last two centuries, the way economic science is done has changed radically: it has become a social science based on mathematical models in place of words. The goal of this seminar is to illuminate the nature and the implications of these changes, explain how economists create(d) their models and how they reason with them. The participants can choose a project based on a series of case studies covered in the chapters of Mary Morgan’s widely acclaimed book The World in the Model : How Economists Work and Think (2012). In addition, students will have to delve into the more technical details of the models that are not covered in the book.
In this seminar, students learn to comprehend, present, critically evaluate and historically situate core economic models. As a result, they should gain knowledge of history of modern economics and better understand the practice of economic modeling.
Responsible teacher of the module: Dr. Andrej Svorenčík
Seminar | |||||||
Seminar | 29.09.20 | Tuesday | 13:45 – 15:15 | tba | |||
Seminar | 20.11.20 | Friday | 10:00 – 18:00 | tba |
Prerequisites: Successful completion of first two years of PhD programme
Requirements for the assignment of ECTS Credits and Grades: A written seminar paper on a topic of own choice and a presentation in class.
Research seminar where Ph.D. students, who have completed their course work, present their own research and receive feedback. This seminar is intended to discuss topics around theoretical as well as applied research in the area of causal inference as well as randomized experiments and experimental design. Students are encouraged to review literature on a topic within this field, and explore if such research field may reflect or support their development of their own PhD project. Seminar topics normally refer to either Econometric Theory, i.e. identification or design development as well as estimators and their properties, or the applicability of methods that are linked to causal identification.
Doctoral Students will know how to
– identify a research question,
– put a research question into context of the relevant literature,
– present their current stage of research to their peers in a seminar environment.
Seminar | |||||||
Seminar | 09.09.20 – 09.12.20 | Wednesday | 12:00 – 13:30 | online |
In this seminar, internal and external speakers discuss their recent research in environmental economics. Students working on an empirical or theoretical project that is related to environmental economics are welcome to present. Please contact the instructor to set up a date.
Seminar | |||||||
Seminar | 15.09.20 – 08.12.20 | Tuesday, every two weeks | 12:30 – 14:00 | online |
Prerequisites: E700-E703, E801-E806
Economic history is important to understand long-run economic development, in particular to study the question why some countries are rich and others remain poor. In this course, we focus on selected topics of quantitative economic history that applied economists and economic historians explored in recent years. Topics include trade and the growth of cities, the importance of institutions for economic development, religion, human capital, innovation, market integration, financial development, inequality, and health and epidemics. The lecture (2 hours) gives you an overview on recent empirical research on each topic. In the exercise sessions, we then discuss important research papers in more depth. It is required that every course participant presents a critical discussion of a research paper in the exercise session. The presentation accounts for 20% of the final grade, and the participation in the related discussions accounts for 10% of the final grade.
Grading: Written exam (100 min, 70%), presentation (20%), discussion participation (10%).
Additional requirements for PhD students:
In addition to the regular course work, PhD students have to write a short empirical research paper on a topic that will be developed together with the course instructor (potential data sets are also provided by the course instructor); the regular course work (exam, presentation, and discussion participation) and the research paper account for 50% of the overall grade, respectively.
Students will acquire thorough knowledge of empirical methods used in modern applied economics and of the main topics of research in economic history. They will be able to apply their knowledge of econometrics in analyzing research questions in economic history and to discuss potential policy implications, for example with respect to development policy. The course also aims at enabling students to critically evaluate research designs they may encounter in their future career.
Further information: I will upload a detailed syllabus (including a list of references) on my website (https://www.vwl.uni-mannheim.de/en/donges/) in July.
Contact: Dr. Alexander Donges; phone: 0621-181-3428; e-mail: donges@uni-mannheim.de; office: L7, 3–5, Raum S10.
Lecture | |||||||
08.09.20 – 08.12.20 | Tuesday | 08:30 – 10:00 | online | ||||
10.09.20 – 10.12.20 | Thursday | 08:30 – 10:00 | online | ||||
Prerequisites
E700-E703 and E801-E806.
The lecture will focus on multivariate time series models. After reviewing a few issues on (non)stationary univariate time series models discussed in Advanced Econometrics III, we will first deal with stable VAR models and their use for forecasting, Granger causality and impulse response analysis. To this end, we will also discuss important issues on asymptotic- and bootstrap-based inference. Afterwards, we discuss stable VARMA processes and infinite-order VARs. Finally, we consider integrated multivariate processes, i.e. will we deal with unit root econometrics as well as cointegration, including VEC modelling. The course both addresses asymptotic analyses as well as implementation issues. Accordingly, tutorial sessions are also devoted to coding and empirical problems besides addressing theoretical problems. In the last part of the course, participants introduce or discuss in more details (further) model classes by giving presentations and writing a paper. We may cover e.g. Bayesian VARs, structural VARs, factor-augmented VARs, VARMA models, etc.. This course is complementary to the course Structural Vector Autoregessive Analysis offered by Matthias Meier. While the latter course focus on structural modelling approaches from an applied macro perspective, we take an econometric approach and deal with multivariate I(1) approaches, VECM and VARMA models in more detail.
Grading and assignment of ECTS-credits
Paper (40 %), presentation (30 %), assignments (30 %)
Literature
The students have acquired the necessary demanding econometric, statistical and mathematical techniques to understand and solve theoretical problems in uni-variate and multiple, time series analysis, i.e. in special fields of Econometrics. They are able to understand methodologically demanding specialist literature and, based on that, can extend their methodological knowledge independently. They are able to sort out relevant literature for problem solving, i.e. they can analyze and synthesise the special literature. The students have acquired basic tools for empirical time series analysis and can understand empirical time series literature. Based on their methodological expertise, they are able to independently extend their knowledge in order to conduct own empirical analyses. The students can formulate research questions, are able to analyze and address them, and and can present, discuss, and defend research results in written and oral form.
Lecture | |||||||
Lecture | 07.09.20 – 21.09.20 | Monday | 15:30 – 17:00 | L9, 003 | |||
Lecture | 10.09.20 – 24.09.20 | Thursday | 10:15 – 11:45 | L9, 003 | |||
Lecture | 28.09.20 – 14.12.20 | Monday | 15:30 – 17:00 | L7, 001 | |||
Lecture | 01.10.20 – 10.12.20 | Thursday | 10:15 – 11:45 | L7, 001 | |||
Prerequisites: First and second year PhD courses.
Requirements for the assignment: Presenting of Research Projects
Research seminar where Ph.D. students, who have completed their course work, present their own research and receive feedback. Occasionally we will also have an outside speaker.
Seminar | |||||||
Seminar | 10.09.20 – 17.09.20 | Thursday | 12:00 – 13:30 | SN 169 | |||
Seminar | 24.09.20 – 10.12.20 | Thursday | 12:00 – 13:30 | L7, 001 |
E700-E703, E801-E806
Requirements for the Assignment of ECTS Credits and Grades
Presentation (100 %).
This seminar is aimed at PhD students writing their dissertation in Industrial Organization. It is intended to guide students at all stages of dissertation research. The emphasis be on presentation and discussion of material by students.
Doctoral Students will know how to
Seminar | |||||||
Seminar | 09.09.20 – 09.12.20 | Wednesday | 12:00 – 13:30 | online |
First-year sequence in the Economics PhD program
Students will read, present and discuss current research concerning the optimal design of mechanisms.
Grading and assignment of ECTS-credits: Presentations
On successful completion of the module, students are expected to attain the following competences:
Lecture | |||||||
Lecture | 09.09.20 – 09.12.20 | Wednesday | 10:15 – 11:45 | online | |||
Prerequisites: E700-E703, E801-E806
Requirements for the assignment of ECTS-Credits and Grades: written exam (90 minutes)
Goals and Contents of the module:
The Role of institutions in economic policymaking/
Overview of the course
Game theory: a short introduction
Mechanism Design
Basic setup
The revelation principle in dominant strategies
The Gibbard Satterthwaite theorem
Bayesian implementation/
Quasilinear environments
VCG mechanisms
AGV mechanisms
Participation constraints
The Myerson Satterthwaite theorem
Robust possibility theorems
Auctions
Optimal mechanisms
Robust mechanism design
Preference aggregation
Theory
Experimental evidence
Information aggregation in committees
Theory
Experimental evidence
Financing public goods
Theory
Experimental evidence
Mechanisms for fiscal stability
Economic policy and credit markets
Mechanisms for monetary policy
Students learn about theories of information aggregation in institutions. They learn to apply them to practical problems.
Lecture | |||||||
Lecture | 21.09.20 – 07.12.20 | Monday | 15:30 – 18:00 | L7, S031 | |||
E700-E703, E801-E806
Students present and discuss policy related economic research.
Requirements for the assignment of ECTS-Credits and Grades
At least one presentation. Students who wish to obtain ECTS credits should sign up for the course, students who do not wish to obtain credits should not sign up for the course.
Students learn to apply economic theory and quantitative methods to policy problems.
Further information: Students who would like to participate should contact Hans Grüner before the beginning of the semester
Contact Information: Prof. Dr. Grüner, Phone: (0621) 181-1886, email: gruener@uni-mannheim.de, Office: L7, 3–5, room 2–06
Seminar | |||||||
Seminar | 21.09.20 – 07.12.20 | Monday | 18:00 – 19:30 | L7, S031 |
E700-E703, E801-E806
Goals and Contents of the module:
Presentation and discussion of current research in public economics (external and internal speakers)
Requirements for the assignment of ECTS-Credits and Grades: Oral presentation of own reserach, contribution to discussion of other perticipants' reserach; only pass/
Improve presentations skills, obtain feedback to improve research paper.
Seminar | |||||||
Seminar | 08.09.20 – 08.12.20 | Tuesday | 12:00 – 13:30 | online |
Prerequisites: First year courses
The course introduces the recent literature on behavioural game theory and learning:
Information Cascades
Quantal- response equilibrium
Level- k theories
Fictious Play
Reinforcement Learning
Experience weighted attraction learning
Imitation
Grading and assignment of ECTS credits
Written exam (90 min)
Literature
Fudenberg, D. and D. Levine (1998) “The Theory of Learning in Games”, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT- Press
Colin Camerer (2003) “Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction”, Princeton University Press
Expected competences acquired after completion of the module: Students should be able to read and understand the literature on learning in games. They should acquire several necessary theoretical and experimental tools that can be a starting point for independent Ph.D.
Lecture | |||||||
Lecture | 13.10.20 – 01.12.20 | Tuesday | 13:45 – 15:15 | L7, S031 | |||
E700- E703, E801- E806
In this seminar participants present and discuss their current research as well as ideas for future research. An important goal of the seminar is to provide a forum for students working on projects that use experimental methods or relate to themes in behavioral economics.
Grading and assignment of ECTS credits
Presentation and active participation
Further information
If you are interested in the seminar, please contact Henrik Orzen.
Designing laboratory or field experiments; Executing research projects; Presenting own research results.
Seminar | |||||||
Seminar | 08.09.20 – 08.12.20 | Tuesday | 13:45 – 15:15 | online |
Prerequisites: E700-E703, E801-E806
Grading and ECTS credits: Presence and participation in discussion and presentation of own research. Writing a research proposal. Grades are assigned on a pass/
This module is intended to introduce students to current topics in Experimental and Behavioral Economics and to familiarize them with recent advances in the eld. The course will be delivered via a mix of lectures, joint readings of papers, in-class discussions, and project work. The lectures will provide introductions to various topics and give relevant background information. Selected papers from the recent relevant literature will be discussed in depth. For this to work all participants will have to read these papers in advance. Over the course of the semester each student is expected to lead the in-class discussion of two of the papers. The module will also provide a forum for students to discuss research ideas and preliminary work. In fact, students are expected to develop a research project of their own and present their advances, experimental design or data. This can be done individually or in pairs.
Students will gain insights into recent topics of research in experimental and behavioral economics. Students gain the ability to present in a clear and structured way their own research ideas. Students gain the ability to criticize in an adequate and constructive way research ideas and their implementation. Students are able to recognize the potentials of a research idea.
Semester dates
1. General information meeting: 18th of September 2020; 12:00
2. First presentations: 2nd of October 2020; 12:00–17:00.
3. Weekly meetings: every Friday 12:00–17:00.
4. Deadline for the research proposal: 3rd of January 2021.
Lecture | |||||||
Info meeting | 18.09.20 | Friday | 12:00 – 00:00 | L7, S031 | |||
Weekly meetings | 02.10.20 – 11.12.20 | Friday | 12:00 – 17:00 | L7, S031 | |||
Prerequisites all first year Ph.D. courses
Grading: active participation in class (20%), problem sets (40%), presentation (40%).
This course offers a rigorous introduction to international trade at the Ph.D. level, emphasizing both theoretical models and empirical evidence. The first part of the course will be structured as a lecture. We will discuss the core models of modern international trade theory. We will first study neoclassical trade models, i.e., the Ricardian- (Eaton-Kortum) and Heckscher-Ohlin models, and then move to trade models with imperfect competition. Particular emphasis will be given to models with firm-level heterogeneity. We will also discuss theories of multinational firms, offshoring and global value chains, the labor market consequences of international trade and trade policy.
The second part of the course will be organized as a seminar: depending on the number of participants, either students will present papers at the research frontier or there will be a reading group format. Topics covered depend on the students’ interests.
Students are familiar with the core models and methods used in modern research in international trade. They know the research frontier in this field and are able to start independent research projects that may lead to a dissertation in the field of international trade.
Further information:
No single textbook covers the topics of this course adequately and the lectures will be based mostly on research articles. A useful reference for students who want to get an idea about the field of international trade is:
Feenstra, R.C. (2015): Advanced International Trade: Theory and Evidence, 2nd edition, Princeton University Press.
Gopinath, G. E.Helpman and K.Rogoff, eds. (2014): Handbook of International Economics, Elsevier
Contact Information: Harald Fadinger; Phone: (0621) 181 -3505; email: herald.fadinger@uni-mannheim.de Office: 4.19, Office hours: upon appointment
Lecture | |||||||
Lecture | 08.09.20 – 08.12.20 | Tuesday | 10:15 – 11:45 | L7, S031 | |||
Lecture | 10.09.20 – 10.12.20 | Thursday | 12:00 – 13:30 | L7, S031 | |||