Course Catalog

E8004: Reading Course Environmental Economics (3rd & 4th year)

Lecturer(s)

Tom Krebs

Course Type: elective course

Course Number: E8001

Credits: 5

Prerequisites

Prerequisites: E700-E703, E801-E806

Schedule

Lecture
Lecture	09.09.21 – 09.12.21	Thursday	13:45 – 15:15	online (access via Portal2)

E8008: Doctoral Colloquium (3rd & 4th year)

Lecturer(s)

Ulrich Wagner

Course Type: elective course

Course Number: E8004

Credits: 2.5

Prerequisites

Presentations

Course Content

Students will read, present and discuss papers in environmental economics.

Competences acquired

Presentation skills
Participation in scientific discourse
Absorption of recent research in environmental economics
Acquisition of a reading routine

Schedule

Lecture
Lecture	06.09.21 – 29.11.21	Monday, every two weeks	13:45 – 15:15	L9, 1–2, Room 002
Lecture	20.09.21 – 20.09.21	Monday	13:45 – 15:15	L9, 1–2 Room 009
Lecture	13.12.21 – 13.09.21	Monday	13:45 – 15:15	L9, 1–2, Room 009

E8010: Econometrics Research Seminar (3rd & 4th year)

Lecturer(s)

Klaus Adam

Course Type: elective course

Course Number: E8008

Credits: 5

Schedule

Colloquium
Colloquium	09.09.21 – 09.12.21	Thursday	13:45 – 15:15	L7, 3–5 Room 2.44

E8012: Macro Reading Group (2nd year +)

Lecturer(s)

Christoph Rothe

Course Type: elective course

Course Number: E8010

Credits: 5

Course Content

This seminar provides a forum for internal and external speakers to discuss their recent research in econometrics. Students working on either econometrics or an empirical project with a substantive econometric component are welcome to present. Please contact the instructor to set up a date.

Schedule

Seminar
Seminar	09.09.21 – 09.12.21	Thursday	15:30 – 17:00	L7, 3–5 Room 410

E8017: Macroeconomic Shocks & Propagation: Methods and applications (2nd year)

Lecturer(s)

Minchul Yum

Course Type: elective course

Course Number: E8012

Credits: 5

Prerequisites

Formal: 2nd and higher year Ph.D. students from the Center for Doctoral Studies in Economics (CDSE).
2nd year students from the Master of Economic Research.

Course Content

Course Content
Students are expected to gain knowledge on the frontier of modern quantitative macroeconomic research on growth and business cycles.

Requirements for the assignment of ECTS Credits and Grades

Presentation 80%
Discussion 20%

Competences acquired

Students are expected to gain knowledge on the frontier of modern quantitative macroeconomic research on growth and business cycles.

Schedule

Seminar
Seminar	06.09.21 – 06.12.21	Monday	13:45 – 15:15	L7, 3–5 Room P043

E8019: Market Design (2nd year)

Lecturer(s)

Matthias Meier

Course Type: elective course

Course Number: E8017

Credits: 7.5

Prerequisites

E700–703, E801–806

Course Content

Course Content

This course covers both methods and applications in empirical macroeconomics. On the methodological side, we cover structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) models. The focus will be on various identification strategies (e.g., short-run/long-run restrictions, sign restrictions, external instruments), but also inference, factor models, nonlinear models. In addition, we discuss narrative approaches to identify structural shocks and univariate methods to study their propagation. The lectures and assignments introduce a range of applications. Those include the analysis of technology shocks, monetary policy shocks, and fiscal policy shocks.

Teaching Method

Lecture (2 SWS) and Exercise (1 SWS)

Requirements for the Assignment of ECTS Credits and Grades

A research paper and regular assignments.

Literature

Ramey (Handbook of Macroeconomics, 2016, Volume 2A, Chapter 2: Macroeconomic Shocks and Their Propagation)

Kilian and Lütkepohl (Structural Vector Autoregressive Analysis, 2017; see www-personal.umich.edu/~lkilian/book.html)

Lütkepohl (New Introduction to Multiple Time Series Analysis, 2005)

Competences acquired

The course introduces students to econometric methods and macroeconomic applications with a focus on business cycles.

Schedule

Lecture
Lecture	06.09.21 – 18.10.21	Monday	10:15 – 11:45	L9, 1–2, Room 002
Lecture	06.09.21 – 18.10.21	Monday	17:15 – 18:45	L9, 1–2, Room 002
Lecture	13.12.21 – 13.12.21	Monday	08:30 – 18:30	L9, 1–2, Room 002

E8028: Financial Contract Theory (2nd year)

Lecturer(s)

Vitali Gretschko

Course Type: elective course

Course Number: E8019

Credits: 5

Prerequisites

Prerequisites: E700-E703

Grading and ECTS credits: Exam + Assignments

Course Content

The digital economy led to many new services where supply is matched with demand for various types of goods and services. More and more people and organizations are now in a position to design market rules that are being implemented in software. The design of markets is challenging as it needs to consider strategic behavior of market participants, psychological factors, and computational problems in order to implement the objectives of a designer. The recent years have led to many new insights and principles for the design of markets, which are beyond traditional economic theory. This course introduces the fundamentals of market design, an engineering field concerned with the design of real-world markets.

A. Matching Algorithms

Part A.1: introduction to matching markets and applications (school choice, kidney exchange, marriage and dating). Two sided matching problems (existence, lattice structure, different algorithms, expected ranking, number of stable marriages). Roommate problems (existence, Irving’s algorithm, expected ranking, number of stable marriages). Many to one matching.

Mandatory read before class: David Gale and Lloyd Shapley (1962), “College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage” American Mathematical Monthly, 69, 9–15.

Part A.2: Paths to stability. Rural hospital theorem. Tradeoffs between fairness and stability. Properties of large matching markets. Coupon collector problem. Unbalanced markets.

Mandatory reading before class: McVitie, David G., and Leslie B. Wilson. “Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets.” BIT Numerical Mathematics 10.3 (1970): 295–309.

Part A.3: Assignment problems. Random assignment. Competitive equilibrium with equal incomes and the Eisenberg-Gale program. Envy-freeness. House allocation and TTC.

Mandatory read before class: Hylland and Zeckhauser (1977) “The efficient allocation of individuals to positions.” Journal of Political Economy 87, 293–314.

Additional reading for Part A

Nikhil Agarwal, Itai Ashlagi, Eduardo Azevedo, Clayton R Featherstone, Ömer Karaduman. “Market failure in kidney exchange”. Forthcoming in the AER.

Ashlagi, Itai, and Alvin E. Roth. “Free riding and participation in large scale, multi‐hospital kidney exchange.” Theoretical Economics 9.3 (2014): 817–863.

Troyan, Peter, and Thayer Morrill. “Obvious Manipulations.” R&R at Journal of Economic Theory.

Competences acquired

After participating in the course, the participants understand methods and game-theoretical models of auctions as well as the fundamental problems in the design of matching markets. They are able to assess the properties of different auction formats and matching algorithms, and the results of theoretical and experimental analyses.

Contact Information: Gretschko, Vitali; vitali.gretschkomail-zew.de

Schedule

Lecture
Lecture	08.09.21 – 08.12.21	Wednesday	12:00 – 13:30	online

E8035: PhD Seminar for Job Market Candidates (5th year +)

Lecturer(s)

Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden

Course Type: elective course

Course Number: E8028

Credits: 5

Prerequisites

Prerequisites: E700–703, E801–806

Requirements for the assignment of ECTS-Credits and Grades: One homework (40%), one research paper about a set of articles (40%), and a presentation (60 minutes) of this paper (20%).

Course Content

The course teaches contract theory at the level of the research frontier. It reviews a number of classic topics in contract theory and puts them in an abstract general framework that makes it possible to understand the underlying common structure of these topics. All topics are from finance, but there are many links to other fields of economics. The course therefore also benefits doctoral students in finance and serves as a bridge between the two fields.
The main topics are:
1. Contracts and contingent markets, 2. Debt Contracts, 3. Hidden actions, 4. Incomplete contracts and renegotiation.

Competences acquired

Students are supposed to understand the deep structure of hidden information, hidden actions, and unverifiability problems and the common features shared by these problems. They are able to master the complex technical difficulties arising in the formulation and solution of such problems and can use the tools of contract theory in their own research.
Students are able to read publications at the research frontier in information economics and contract theory in the fields of finance and related areas and to judge the conceptual value of the approaches taken in these papers. They can communicate their findings to other students and researchers by means of full academic presentation and in research-type articles. They can evaluate the relevance and correctness of technical arguments made in the literature and identify mistakes in publications. They are capable of assessing which arguments are novel and likely to generate intellectual progress, and which ones are just technical firework.

Schedule

Lecture
Lecture	07.09.21 – 07.12.21	Tuesday	08:30 – 10:00	L7, 3–5, Room S031

E8036: Research Seminar in Applied Economics (3rd & 4th year)

Lecturer(s)

Christoph Rothe

Course Type: elective course

Course Number: E8035

Credits: 2.5

Prerequisites

Prerequisites: Students should expect to graduate within the next academic year.

Course Content

This seminar introduces PhD students that expect to graduate within the next year to the academic job market for economists. Topics covered include (i) job prospects for academic economists, (ii) preparing applications, in particular the job market paper, (iii) interviewing for academic jobs, (iv) job talks and flyouts. Students will receive both general information and personalized guidance on these topics.

Competences acquired

Upon course completion, students will be able to successfully navigate the job market for academic economists.

Contact Information: Christoph Rothe; Phone: (0621) 181 1921; email: rothe@vwl.uni-mannheim.de, Office: 1.11, Office hours: by appointment

E8037: Public Economics I (2nd year)

Lecturer(s)

Antonio Ciccone

Course Type: elective course

Course Number: E8036

Credits: 2.5

Course Content

The seminar will adapt to the interests of the participants as it is meant to help them start on their path to their own research. Participants will be asked to present their ideas and projects, which could be in a very preliminary state, as well as papers that relate to their ideas and projects. We will try and identify open research questions and empirical strategies that can answer these questions.

Schedule

Seminar
Seminar	08.09.21 – 01.12.21	Wednesday, every two weeks	13:45 – 15:15	L7, 3–5 Room P043

E8039: Economic Modeling – Historical and Methodological Perspectives (2nd year)

Lecturer(s)

Duk Gyoo Kim

Course Type: elective course

Course Number: E8037

Credits: 7.5

Prerequisites

Prerequisites: E700-E703 or equivalent

Grading: One 120-minute written exam (100%)

Course Content

This course is intended to be the first part of the PhD-level Public Economics sequence. The field is large, with significant theoretical and empirical components. It covers core ideas in the areas of market failures and public intervention, static and dynamic optimal taxation, social insurance and welfare, and state and local public finance. We will take a normative perspective, that is, we ask what an ideal state would do in order to achieve distributive objectives. The contents will be mostly theoretical, and the theoretical foundations will work as building blocks for empirical studies which will be covered in Public Economics II.

Part I: Market Failures and Public Intervention

Public Goods

Externalities

Asymmetric Information

Price vs. Quantity Regulations

Part II: Tax Theory

Introduction to Taxation / Tax Incidence

Optimal Commodity Taxation

Many-Person Ramsey Tax Rule

Production Efficiency Theorem

Non-linear (Mirrleesian) Taxation of Income

Richardian Equivalence

Tax Smoothing Problem

Optimal Taxation of Capital

New Dynamic Public Finance

Part III: Social Insurance and Welfare

Optimal Transfer Programs

Social Insurance Programs

Part IV: State and Local Public Finance

Local Public Goods

Property Taxation and Zoning

Competences acquired

The course introduces the core topics in Public Economics. The course should prove useful for any student interested in analyzing policy issues.

Further information: Lecture notes will be provided.

Useful references:

Gruber, Public Finance and Public Policy, Worth Publishers, 2019

Atkinson and Stiglitz, Lectures on Public Economics, Mc Graw-Hill, 1980

Salanié, Microeconomics of market failures, MIT Press, 2010

Cornes and Sandler, The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods and Club Goods, Cambridge University Press, 2012

Salanié, The economics of taxation, MIT Press, 2011

Myles, Public Economics, Cambridge University Press, 1995

Mas-Collel, Whinston, Green, Microeconomic Theory, Harvard University Press, 1996

Stiglitz, Economics of the Public sector, 3rd Edition, 2000, Norton & Company

Hindriks and Myles, Intermediate Public Economics, MIT Press

Schedule

Lecture
Lecture	06.09.21 – 15.11.21	Monday	08:30 – 10:00	L7, 3–5, Room P043
Lecture	08.09.21 – 10.11.21	Wednesday	08:30 – 10:00	L7, 3–5, Room P043

E8040: Topics in Experimental Econometrics and Causal Inference (3rd & 4th year)

Lecturer(s)

Andrej Svorenčík

Course Type: elective course

Course Number: E8039

Credits: 5

Prerequisites

Prerequisites: E700 – 703, E801 – 806

Requirements for the assignment of ECTS-Credits and Grades
Presentation (30 minutes, 50%), class participation (Q&A, constructive criticism of other presentations – 10%), seminar paper (40%).

Course Content

During the last two centuries, the way economic science is done has changed radically: it has become a social science based on mathematical models in place of words. The goal of this seminar is to illuminate the nature and the implications of these changes, explain how economists create(d) their models and how they reason with them. The participants can choose a project based on a series of case studies covered in the chapters of Mary Morgan’s widely acclaimed book The World in the Model : How Economists Work and Think (2012). In addition, students will have to delve into the more technical details of the models that are not covered in the book.

Competences acquired

In this seminar, students learn to comprehend, present, critically evaluate and historically situate core economic models. As a result, they should gain knowledge of history of modern economics and better understand the practice of economic modeling.

Responsible teacher of the module
Dr. Andrej Svorenčík, svorencikmail-uni-mannheim.de

Schedule

Seminar
Seminar	07.09.21 – 07.09.21	Tuesday	13:45 – 15:15	tba
Seminar	06.11.21 – 06.11.21	Saturday	10:00 – 18:00	B6, (Bauteil A), room A 304

E8041: Environmental Economics Research Seminar (3rd & 4th year)

Lecturer(s)

Markus Frölich

Course Type: elective course

Course Number: E8040

Credits: 5

Prerequisites

Prerequisites: Successful completion of first two years of PhD program

Requirements for the assignment of ECTS Credits and Grades: A written seminar paper on a topic of own choice and a presentation in class.

Course Content

Research seminar where Ph.D. students, who have completed their course work, present their own research and receive feedback. This seminar is intended to discuss topics around theoretical as well as applied research in the area of causal inference as well as randomized experiments and experimental design. Students are encouraged to review literature on a topic within this field, and explore if such research field may reflect or support their development of their own PhD project. Seminar topics normally refer to either Econometric Theory, i.e. identification or design development as well as estimators and their properties, or the applicability of methods that are linked to causal identification.

Competences acquired

Doctoral Students will know how to
– identify a research question,
– put a research question into context of the relevant literature,
– present their current stage of research to their peers in a seminar environment.

Schedule

Seminar
Seminar	08.09.21 – 08.12.21	Wednesday	12:00 – 13:30	L7, 3–5 Room 410

E8042: Economic History (2nd year)

Lecturer(s)

Ulrich Wagner

Kathrine von Graevenitz

Course Type: elective course

Course Number: E8041

Credits: 2.5

Course Content

In this seminar, internal and external speakers discuss their recent research in environmental economics. Students working on an empirical or theoretical project that is related to environmental economics are welcome to present. Please contact the instructor to set up a date.

Schedule

Seminar
Seminar	07.09.21 – 07.12.21	Tuesday, every two weeks	12:00 – 13:30	L7, 3–5, Room P043

9 ECTS

Lecturer(s)

Alexander Donges

Course Type: elective course

Course Number: E8042

Credits: 9

Prerequisites

Prerequisites: E700-E703, E801-E806

Course Content

Economic history is important to understand long-run economic development, in particular to study the question why some countries are rich and others remain poor. In this course, we focus on selected topics of quantitative economic history that applied economists and economic historians explored in recent years. Topics include trade and the growth of cities, the importance of institutions for economic development, religion, human capital, innovation, market integration, financial development, inequality, and health and epidemics. The lecture (2 hours) gives you an overview on recent empirical research on each topic. In the exercise sessions, we then discuss important research papers in more depth. It is required that every course participant presents a critical discussion of a research paper in the exercise session. The presentation accounts for 20% of the final grade, and the participation in the related discussions accounts for 10% of the final grade.

Grading: Written exam (100 min, 70%), presentation (20%), discussion participation (10%).

Additional requirements for PhD students:
In addition to the regular course work, PhD students have to write a short empirical research paper on a topic that will be developed together with the course instructor (potential data sets are also provided by the course instructor); the regular course work (exam, presentation, and discussion participation) and the research paper account for 50% of the overall grade, respectively.

Competences acquired

Students will acquire thorough knowledge of empirical methods used in modern applied economics and of the main topics of research in economic history. They will be able to apply their knowledge of econometrics in analyzing research questions in economic history and to discuss potential policy implications, for example with respect to development policy. The course also aims at enabling students to critically evaluate research designs they may encounter in their future career.

Further information: I will upload a detailed syllabus (including a list of references) on my website (https://www.vwl.uni-mannheim.de/en/donges/) in July.

Contact: Dr. Alexander Donges; phone: 0621-181-3428; e-mail: donges@uni-mannheim.de; office: L7, 3–5, Raum S10.

Schedule

Lecture
Lecture	07.09.21 – 07.12.21	Tuesday	08:30 – 10:00	online, see link Portal2
Lecture	09.09.21 – 09.12.21	Thursday	08:30 – 10:00	online, see link Portal2

E8045: Optimal Monetary Policy (2nd year)

E8046: The Economics of Pandemics (2nd year +)

Lecturer(s)

Klaus Adam

Course Type: elective course

Course Number: E8045

Credits: 2.5

Prerequisites

All first year PhD courses

Course Content

This course discusses frontier topics in optimal monetary policy design in dynamic macro models. A general familiarity with sticky price models is assumed. Topics covered include: (1) the determinants of the optimal inflation target, (2) the conduct of optimal stabilization policy, (3) implications of an effective lower bound for nominal rates and of falling natural rates of interest, (4) the role of supply side heterogeneity, (5) the role of asset prices, and (3) optimal policy design in the presence of robust concerns/in the absence of rational expectations.

Lecture 1
Determinants of the Optimal Inflation Target – Overview and New Approaches
Schmitt-Grohé, S. and M. Uribe (2010), The Optimal Rate of Inflation, in: Handbook of Monetary Economics, edited by B. M. Friedman and M. Woodford, Volume 3B, 653–722.
Adam, K., and H. Weber (2019), Optimal Trend Inflation, American Economic Review, 2019, Vol. 109(2), 702–737

Lecture 2
Measuring the Optimal Inflation Target
Adam, K., and H. Weber (2020), Estimating the Optimal Inflation Target from Trends in Relative Prices, CEPR Discussion Paper 14335.
Wolman, A. L. (2011), The Optimal Rate of Inflation with Trending Relative Prices, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 43, 355–384.

Lecture 3
Optimal Stabilization Policy with a Lower Bound on Nominal Rates
Adam, K. and R. Billi (2006), Optimal Monetary Policy under Commitment with a Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2006.
Adam, K. and R. Billi (2007), Discretionary Monetary Policy and the Zero Lower Bound on Nominal Interest Rates, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 54, 728–752.
Andrade, P. , H. Le Bihan, J. Galí and J. Matheron, The Optimal Inflation Target and the Natural Rate of Interest, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall Issue, 2019
Gali, J., D. Debortoli and L. Gambetti (2019), On the Empirical (Ir)Relevance of the Zero Lower Bound Constraint, NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 34, 2019, 141–170
Coibion, O., Y. Gorodnichenko and J. Wieland (2012), The Optimal Inflation Rate in New Keynesian Models: Should Central Banks Raise Their Inflation Targets in Light of the Zero Lower Bound?, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 79(4), 1371-1406.
L’Huillier, J.P. and R. Schoenle, Raising the Target: How Much Extra Room Does It Really Give?, Brandeis University mimeo, 2019
Nakata, T. (2017), Uncertainty at the Zero Lower Bound, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 9 (3): 186–221.

Lecture 4
Robust Approaches to Monetary Stabilization Policy
Adam, Matveev and Nagel (2020), Do Survey Expectations of Returns Reflect Risk Adjustments?, Journal of Monetary Economics (forthcoming).
Adam and Woodford (2012), Robustly Optimal Monetary Policy in a Microfounded New-Keynesian Model, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 59, 468–487.
Karantounias (2013), Managing Pessimistic Expectations and Fiscal Policy, Theoretical Economics, Volume 8(1), 193–231.
Hansen and Sargent (2001), Robust Control and Model Uncertainty, American Economic Review, Vol. 91(2), 60–66.
Hansen and Sargent (2008), Robustness, Princeton University Press.
Woodford (2010), Robustly Optimal Monetary Policy with Near-Rational Expectations, American Economic Review, Vol. 100, 274–303.

Lecture 5
Robustly Optimal Monetary Policy and Asset Prices
Adam and Woodford (2020), Robustly Optimal Monetary Policy in a NK Model with Housing, NBER Working Paper No. 26833.
Benigno, P. and L. Paciello (2014), Monetary Policy, Doubts and Asset Prices, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 64, 85–98.

Lecture 6
Monetary Policy Implications of Declining Natural Rates
Adam, Reinelt & Pfäuti (2020), Declining Natural Rates, Rising Housing Price Volatility and the Lower Bound Problem for Monetary Policy, mimeo.
Andrade, P. , H. Le Bihan, J. Galí and J. Matheron, The Optimal Inflation Target and the Natural Rate of Interest, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall Issue, 2019

Lecture 7 Recap and Q&A

Schedule

Lecture
Lecture	14.10.21 – 25.11.21	Thursday	10:15 – 11:45	L7, 3–5, Room P043

E8047: Markets, Morality and Social Responsibility (2nd year)

Lecturer(s)

Michèle Tertilt

Harald Fadinger

Course Type: elective course

Course Number: E8046

Credits: 5

Prerequisites

Prerequisites: E700 – 703, E801 – 806

The course is aimed at second year PhD students. Students in higher years are welcome to participate. The format will be somewhere in between a traditional class and a seminar. It will also include some presentations of external researchers. Students will both present academic papers related to the topic and, at the end of the course, a research idea. The course will be partly virtual (especially when external speakers present) and partly in-class with physical presence required.

Grading: referee report (30%), presentation (30%), term paper (40%).

Course Content

The aim of the course is to familiarize the students with recent research on the economics of pandemics. Topics covered will include economic models of disease transmission, the effect of non-pharmaceutical interventions, the role of macro-economic stabilization policies during pandemics, the design of vaccination policies, and the long-term consequences of pandemics on economic outcomes, including labor market effects, human capital formation, gender…

Reading List

1 MACROECONOMIC MODELS OF THE COVID PANDEMIC AND OPTIMAL POLICY
Luiz Brotherhood, Philipp Kircher, Cezar Santos, and Michele Tertilt: An Economic
Model of the COVID-19 Epidemic: The Importance of Testing and Age-
Specific Policies ,CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper 175, 2020

Martin Eichenbaum, Sergio Rebelo, and Mathias Trabandt: The Macroeconomics
of Epidemics, NBER Working Papers 26882, National Bureau of Economic
Research, 2020

David Baqaee and Emmanuel Farhi: Keynesian Production Networks and
the Covid-19 Crisis: A Simple Benchmark, NBER Working Papers 28346, National
Bureau of Economic Research, 2021

Titan Alon, Minki Kim, David Lagakos and Mitchell VanVuren: How Should
Policy Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic Differ in the Developing World?,NBER
Working Papers 27273, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2020
Luiz Brotherhood, Daniel Da Mata, Tiago Cavalcanti and Cezar Santos:
Slums and Pandemics, SSRN, 2021

Thomas Tröger:Optimal Testing and Social Distancing of Individuals With
Private Health Signals, CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper 229, 2020

2 COVID AND NON-PHARMACEUTICAL INTERVENTIONS

Ingo E. Isphording, Marc Lipfert and Nico Pestel: School Re-Openings after
Summer Breaks in Germany Did Not Increase SARS-CoV-2 Cases, ZA Discussion
Paper 13790, 2021/Journal of Public Economics, 2021, 198, 104426

Jean-Victor Alipour, Harald Fadinger Jan Schymik: My Home is My Castle
– The Benefits of Working from Home During a Pandemic Crisis, Journal of
Public Economics, 2021, 196, 104373

Benjamin Born, Alexander Dietrich and Gernot Muller:The Lockdown Effect:
A counterfactual for Sweden, CEPR Discussion Paper

3 COVID AND WORKING FROM HOME
Jose Maria Barrero, Nicholas Bloom and Steven J. Davis:Why Working from
Home Will StickNBER Working Papers 28731, National Bureau of Economic
Research, 2021
Jean-Victor Alipour, Harald Fadinger Jan Schymik: My Home is My Castle
– The Benefits of Working from Home During a Pandemic Crisis, Journal of
Public Economics, 2021, 196, 104373

Jonathan I. Dingel and Brent Neiman:How Many Jobs Can be Done at
Home?, NBER Working Papers 26948, National Bureau of Economic Research,
2020

Abi Adams-Prassl, Teodora Boneva, Marta Golin, and Christopher Rauh:Work
That Can Be Done from Home: Evidence on Variation within and across Occupations
and Industries, ZA Discussion Paper 13374, 2020b.

4 REGIONAL EFFECTS OF COVID
Arjun Ramani and Nicholas Bloom:The Donut Eect of Covid-19 on Cities,
NBER Working Papers 28876, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2021
Alina Kristin Bartscher, Sebastian Seitz, Michaela Slotwinski, NilsWehrhofer
und Sebastian Siegloch.Social Capital and the Spread of Covid-19: Insights
From European Countries, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 20–023

5 FIRMS
Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, ebnem Kalemli-Özcan, Veronika Penciakova and Nick
Sander:COVID-19 and SMEs: A 2021 “Time Bomb”?, NBER Working Papers
28418, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2021
Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, ebnem Kalemli-Özcan, Veronika Penciakova and
Nick Sander:COVID-19 and SME Failures, NBER Working Papers 27877, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2021

Nicholas Bloom, Robert S. Fletcher and Ethan Yeh:The Impact of COVID-
19 on US Firms, NBER Working Papers 28314, National Bureau of Economic
Research, 2021

Francisco J. Buera, Roberto N. Fattal-Jaef, Hugo Hopenhayn, P. Andres
Neumeyer and Yongseok Shin:The Economic Ripple Effects of COVID-19, NBER
Working Papers 28704, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2021

6 COVID AND SCHOOLS
Francesco Agostinelli, Matthias Doepke, Giuseppe Sorrenti and Fabrizio Zilibotti:
When the Great Equalizer Shuts Down: Schools, Peers, and Parents in
Pandemic Times, NBER Working Papers 28264, National Bureau of Economic
Research, 2020

Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln, Dirk Krueger, Alexander Ludwig and Irina Popova:The
Long-Term Distributional and Welfare Effects of Covid-19 School Closures,
NBER Working Papers 27773, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2020

Philipp Ager, Katherine Eriksson, Ezra Karger, Peter Nencka and Melissa
A. Thomasson:School Closures During the 1918 Flu Pandemic, NBER Working
Papers 28246, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2020

Minchul Yum and Youngsoo Jang:Aggregate and Intergenerational Implications
of School Closures: A Quantitative Assessment, Covid Economics, Vetted
and Real-Time Papers, 57, 46–93, November 2020

7 COVID19 AND GENDER EQUALITY
Titan Alon, Matthias Doepke, Jane Olmstead-Rumsey and Michele Tertilt:The
impact of Covid-19 on gender equality Vetted and Real-Time Papers, Issue 4,
pp. 62–85, April 2020

Titan Alon, Matthias Doepke, Jane Olmstead-Rumsey and Michele Tertilt:
This Time It's Dierent: The Role of Women'sEmployment in a Pandemic
Recession, CEPR DP No. 15149, August 2020

Titan Alon, Sena Coskun, Matthias Doepke, David Koll and Michele Tertilt:
From Mancession to Shecession: Women's Employment in Regular and Pandemic
Recessions, CEPR DP No. 15962, March 2021

8 OTHER LONG TERM EFFECTS OF COVID
Pol Antràs:De-Globalisation? Global Value Chains in the Post-COVID-19 Age,
NBER Working Papers 28115, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2020
Matthias Meier and Eugenio Pinto:Covid-19 Supply Chain Disruptions, Covid
Economics 48

Elu von Thadden, V. Acharya, Z. Jiang, and R. Richmond:Divided We Fall:
International Health and Trade Coordination During a Pandemic, Covid Economics
60, 1–56, 2020

9 PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY OF VACCINES
Michael Kremer, Jonathan Levin and Christopher M. Snyder:Designing Advance
Market Commitments for New Vaccines, SSRN 2020

Juan Camilo Castillo1, Amrita Ahuja2, Susan Athey3,4, Arthur Baker5,
Eric Budish4,6, Tasneem Chipty7, Rachel Glennerster8, Scott Duke Kominers4,9,10,
Michael Kremer4,5, Greg Larson11, Jean Lee12, Canice Prendergast6,
Christopher M. Snyder4,13, Alex Tabarrok14, Brandon Joel Tan10, Witold
Wiecek15:Market design to accelerate COVID-19 vaccine supply, Science 12
Mar 2021: Vol. 371, Issue 6534, pp. 1107-1109

Claudius Gros and Daniel Gros. Incentives for accelerating the production of
Covid-19 vaccines in the presence of adjustment costs, CEPR Covid Economics
Romans Pancs:A Vaccine Auction, Covid Economics, 2021, Issue 68, 100–114
Nikhil Vellodi and Joshua Weiss:Optimal Vaccine Policies: Spillovers and
Incentives, CEPR Covid Economics, Issue 65

Competences acquired

Students are familiar with the key concepts and models used in the research on the economics of pandemics. They know the research frontier in this field and are able to start independent research projects.

Contact Information:
Harald Fadinger; Phone: (0621) 181 -3505; email: harald.fadinger@uni-mannheim.de Office: 4.19, Office hours: upon appointment
Michèle Tertilt; Phone: (0621) 181-1902, email: tertilt@uni-mannheim.de, Office: P.11/12, Office hours: by appointment.

Schedule

Lecture
Lecture	09.09.21 – 09.12.21	Thursday	15:30 – 17:00	Palace East Wing, O148 and online (access via Portal2)

E823: Advanced Time Series Analysis (2nd year)

Lecturer(s)

Nicolas Bonneton

Course Type: elective course

Course Number: E8047

Credits: 7.5

Prerequisites

Prerequisites: All first year PhD courses

Grading: the student can choose between:

i) one presentation + one referee report,
ii) one research proposal.

Course Content

Course content:

This course covers some recent advancements on the topic morality & markets.
Each paper discussed will provide an element of answer to one of the following questions:

• How to measure and model the ethical preferences of market participants (managers, consumers, employees, etc.)?

• Why, and how, do many companies undertake supposedly virtuous actions?

• How to design contracts to screen and incentivize motivated employees?

• How to incite companies to adopt more sustainable practices? Warning: incentives may backfire.

Although we are going to discuss both the empirical (mainly field and lab experiments) and theoretical literature, the focus will be mainly put on the theory.
In addition to students interested in morality and markets, I particularly welcome and encourage theory-oriented students to take this class if they are interested in incorporating ideas and tools from
behavioral economics into their research.

Preliminary reading list:

Alger, I. and Weibull, J.W. (2013). Homo moralis—preference evolution under incomplete information
and assortative matching. Econometrica, 81(6):2269–2302.

Ambuehl, S., Niederle, M., and Roth, A. E. (2015). More money, more problems? can high pay be
coercive and repugnant? American Economic Review, 105(5):357–60.

Ariely, D., Bracha, A., and Meier, S. (2009). Doing good or doing well? image motivation and
monetary incentives in behaving prosocially. American Economic Review, 99(1):544–55.

Ashraf, N., Bandiera, O., Davenport, E., and Lee, S. (2019). Losing prosociality in the quest for
talent? sorting, selection, and productivity in the delivery of public services. American Economic
Review (Forthcoming).

Auriol, E. and Brilon, S. (2014). Anti-social behavior in profit and nonprofit organizations. Journal
of Public Economics, 117:149–161.

Bagnoli, M. andWatts, S. G. (2003). Selling to socially responsible consumers: Competition and the
private provision of public goods. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 12(3):419–445.

Baland, J.-M. and Duprez, C. (2009). Are labels effective against child labor? Journal of Public
Economics, 93(11):1125–1130.

Bandiera, O., Barankay, I., and Rasul, I. (2005). Social preferences and the response to incentives:
Evidence from personnel data. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(3):917–962.

Barfort, S., Harmon, N. A., Hjorth, F., and Olsen, A. L. (2019). Sustaining honesty in public service:
The role of selection. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 11(4):96–123.

Baron, D. P. (2009). A positive theory of moral management, social pressure, and corporate social
performance. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 18(1):7–43.

Bartling, B. and Fischbacher, U. (2012). Shifting the blame: On delegation and responsibility. The
Review of Economic Studies, 79(1):67–87.

Bartling, B., Weber, R. A., and Yao, L. (2015). Do markets erode social responsibility? The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130(1):219–266.

Benabou, R. and Tirole, J. (2003). Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. The review of economic studies,
70(3):489–520.

Bénabou, R. and Tirole, J. (2006). Incentives and prosocial behavior. American economic review,
96(5):1652–1678.

Bénabou, R. and Tirole, J. (2010). Individual and corporate social responsibility. Economica,
77(305):1–19.

Bénabou, R. and Tirole, J. (2011). Identity, morals, and taboos: Beliefs as assets. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 126(2):805–855.

Bénabou, R. and Tirole, J. (2016). Bonus culture: Competitive pay, screening, and multitasking.
Journal of Political Economy, 124(2):305–370.

Besley, T. (2013). What’s the good of the market? an essay on michael sandel’s what money can’t
buy. Journal of Economic Literature, 51(2):478–95.

Besley, T. and Ghatak, M. (2005). Competition and incentives with motivated agents. The American
economic review, 95(3):616–636.

Besley, T. and Ghatak, M. (2018). Prosocial motivation and incentives. Annual Review of Economics,
10:411–438.

Bonnefon, J.-F., Landier, A., Sastry, P., and Thesmar, D. (2019). Do investors care about corporate
externalities? experimental evidence. HEC Paris Research Paper No. FIN-2019-1350.

Bonneton, N. (2020a). Competition and screening with motivated agents. working paper.

Bonneton, N. (2020b). The market for ethical goods. working paper.

Bremzen, A., Khokhlova, E., Suvorov, A., and Van de Ven, J. (2015). Bad news: An experimental
study on the informational effects of rewards. Review of Economics and Statistics, 97(1):55–70.

Bursztyn, L., Fiorin, S., Gottlieb, D., and Kanz, M. (2019). Moral incentives in credit card debt
repayment: evidence from a field experiment. Journal of Political Economy, 127(4):1641–1683.
Dal B´o, E. and Tervi¨o, M. (2013). Self-esteem, moral capital, and wrongdoing. Journal of the
European Economic Association, 11(3):599–633.

Dana, J., Weber, R. A., and Kuang, J. X. (2007). Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments
demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness. Economic Theory, 33(1):67–80.

Delfgaauw, J. and Dur, R. (2007). Signaling and screening of workers’ motivation. Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization, 62(4):605–624.

DellaVigna, S., List, J. A., and Malmendier, U. (2012). Testing for altruism and social pressure in
charitable giving. The quarterly journal of economics, 127(1):1–56.

Deserranno, E. (2019). Financial incentives as signals: experimental evidence from the recruitment
of village promoters in uganda. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 11(1):277–317.

Dizon-Ross, R., Dupas, P., and Robinson, J. (2017). Governance and the effectiveness of public
health subsidies: Evidence from ghana, kenya and uganda. Journal of public economics, 156:150–
169.

Ellingsen, T. and Johannesson, M. (2008). Pride and prejudice: The human side of incentive theory.
American economic review, 98(3):990–1008.

Exley, C. L. (2016). Excusing selfishness in charitable giving: The role of risk. The Review of
Economic Studies, 83(2):587–628.

Falk, A. and Kosfeld, M. (2006). The hidden costs of control. American Economic Review,
96(5):1611–1630.

Falk, A., Neuber, T., and Szech, N. (2020). Diffusion of being pivotal and immoral outcomes. The
Review of Economic Studies, 87(5):2205–2229.

Falk, A. and Szech, N. (2013). Morals and markets. science, 340(6133):707–711.

Fioretti, M. (2020). Caring or pretending to care? social impact, firms’ objectives and welfare.
Technical report, Tech. rep., Mimeo, Sciences Po.

Friebel, G., Kosfeld, M., and Thielmann, G. (2019). Trust the police? self-selection of motivated
agents into the german police force. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 11(4):59–78.

Gino, F., Norton, M. I., and Weber, R. A. (2016). Motivated bayesians: Feeling moral while acting
egoistically. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 30(3):189–212.
Glaeser, E. L. and Shleifer, A. (2001). Not-for-profit entrepreneurs. Journal of public economics,
81(1):99–115.

Hamman, J. R., Loewenstein, G., andWeber, R. A. (2010). Self-interest through delegation: An additional
rationale for the principal-agent relationship. American Economic Review, 100(4):1826–46.

Henderson, R. and Van den Steen, E. (2015). Why do firms have” purpose”? the firm’s role as a
carrier of identity and reputation. American Economic Review, 105(5):326–30.

Kitzmueller, M. and Shimshack, J. (2012). Economic perspectives on corporate social responsibility.
Journal of Economic Literature, 50(1):51–84.

Lacetera, N., Macis, M., and Slonim, R. (2012). Will there be blood? incentives and displacement
effects in pro-social behavior. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 4(1):186–223.

Lacetera, N., Macis, M., and Slonim, R. (2013). Economic rewards to motivate blood donations.
Science, 340(6135):927–928.

List, J. A. (2006). The behavioralist meets the market: Measuring social preferences and reputation
effects in actual transactions. Journal of political Economy, 114(1):1–37.

Magill, M., Quinzii, M., and Rochet, J.-C. (2015). A theory of the stakeholder corporation. Econometrica,
83(5):1685–1725.

Prendergast, C. (2007). The motivation and bias of bureaucrats. American Economic Review,
97(1):180–196.

Rustichini, A. (2018). Morality, policy, and the brain. Journal of Economic Literature, 56(1):217–33.

Schedule

Lecture
Lecture	17.09.21 – 10.12.21	Friday	10:15 – 11:45	L7, 3–5 Room P043
Lecture	17.09.21 – 10.12.21	Friday	12:00 – 13:30	L7, 3–5 Room P043

9 ECTS

Lecturer(s)

Carsten Trenkler

Course Type: elective course

Course Number: E823

Credits: 9

Prerequisites

Prerequisites

E700-E703 and E801-E806.

Course Content

The lecture will focus on multivariate time series models. After reviewing a few issues on (non)stationary univariate time series models discussed in Advanced Econometrics III, we will first deal with stable VAR models and their use for forecasting, Granger causality and impulse response analysis. To this end, we will also discuss important issues on asymptotic- and bootstrap-based inference. Afterwards, we discuss stable VARMA processes and infinite-order VARs. Finally, we consider integrated multivariate processes, i.e. will we deal with unit root econometrics as well as cointegration, including VEC modelling. The course both addresses asymptotic analyses as well as implementation issues. Accordingly, tutorial sessions are also devoted to coding and empirical problems besides addressing theoretical problems. In the last part of the course, participants introduce or discuss in more details (further) model classes by giving presentations and writing a paper. We may cover e.g. Bayesian VARs, structural VARs, factor-augmented VARs, VARMA models, etc.. This course is complementary to the course Structural Vector Autoregessive Analysis offered by Matthias Meier. While the latter course focus on structural modelling approaches from an applied macro perspective, we take an econometric approach and deal with multivariate I(1) approaches, VECM and VARMA models in more detail.

Grading and assignment of ECTS-credits

Paper (40 %), presentation (30 %), assignments (30 %)

Literature

Hamilton, J.D. (1994), Time Series Analysis, Princeton University Press
Hayashi, F. (2000), Econometrics, Princeton University Pres
Lütkepohl (2017), Structural Vector Autoregressive Analysis, CUP
Lütkepohl, H. (2005), New Introduction to Multiple Time Series Analysis, Springer
Lütkepohl, H. and Krätzig, M. (2004), Applied Time Series Econometrics, CUP
Davidson R. and MacKinnon, J.G. (2004) Econometric Theory and Methods, Oxford University Press
White, H. (2000), Asymptotic Theory for Econometricians, Academic Press

Competences acquired

The students have acquired the necessary demanding econometric, statistical and mathematical techniques to understand and solve theoretical problems in uni-variate and multiple, time series analysis, i.e. in special fields of Econometrics. They are able to understand methodologically demanding specialist literature and, based on that, can extend their methodological knowledge independently. They are able to sort out relevant literature for problem solving, i.e. they can analyze and synthesise the special literature. The students have acquired basic tools for empirical time series analysis and can understand empirical time series literature. Based on their methodological expertise, they are able to independently extend their knowledge in order to conduct own empirical analyses. The students can formulate research questions, are able to analyze and address them, and and can present, discuss, and defend research results in written and oral form.

Schedule

Lecture
Lecture & Exercise	06.09.21 – 06.12.21	Monday	15:30 – 17:00	L7, 3–5, Room P043
Lecture & Exercise	08.09.21 – 08.12.21	Wednesday	08:30 – 10:00	L7, 3–5, Room P043

E839: Topics in Macroeconomics (3rd & 4th year)

E841: Theory of Industrial Organization (2nd year)

Lecturer(s)

Antoine Camous

Andreas Gulyas

Course Type: elective course

Course Number: E839

Credits: 5

Prerequisites

Prerequisites: First and second year PhD courses.

Requirements for the assignment: Presenting of Research Projects

Course Content

Research seminar where Ph.D. students, who have completed their course work, present their own research and receive feedback. Occasionally we will also have an outside speaker.

Schedule

Seminar
Seminar	09.09.21 – 09.12.21	Thursday	12:00 – 13:30	L9, 1–2 Room 001

E846: PhD Reading Course in Industrial Organization (3rd & 4th year)

Lecturer(s)

Volker Nocke

Course Type: elective course

Course Number: E841

Credits: 7.5

Prerequisites

All first-year PhD courses

Course Content

Goals and Contents of the module: PhD-level course of the modern theory of industrial organization. Topics include monopoly pricing, static and dynamic oligopoly, collusion, mergers, industry dynamics, vertical relations.

Requirements for the Assignment of ECTS Credits and Grades

Written exam (100 %)

Competences acquired

Acquisition of a deep understanding of the key topics, seminal models, and frontiers of research in theoretical industrial organization.

Schedule

Lecture
Lecture	07.09.21 – 07.12.21	Tuesday	10:15 – 11:45	L9, 1–2, Room 003
Lecture	07.09.21 – 07.12.21	Tuesday	12:00 – 13:30	L9, 1–2, Room 003

E854: Topics in Mechanism Design (2nd year)

Lecturer(s)

Volker Nocke

Course Type: elective course

Course Number: E846

Credits: 5

Prerequisites

E700-E703, E801-E806

Requirements for the Assignment of ECTS Credits and Grades

Presentation (100 %).

Course Content

This seminar is aimed at PhD students writing their dissertation in Industrial Organization. It is intended to guide students at all stages of dissertation research. The emphasis be on presentation and discussion of material by students.

Competences acquired

Doctoral students will know how to

identify a research question,
put a research question into context of the relevant literature,
present their current stage of research to their peers in a seminar environment.

Schedule

Seminar
Seminar	08.09.21 – 08.12.21	Wednesday	12:00 – 13:30	L7, 3–5 Room P043

E859: Institutional Economics and Economic Policy (2nd year)

Lecturer(s)

Thomas Tröger

Course Type: elective course

Course Number: E854

Credits: 5

Prerequisites

First-year sequence in the Economics PhD program

Course Content

Students will read, present and discuss current research concerning the optimal design of mechanisms.

Grading and assignment of ECTS-credits: Presentations

Competences acquired

On successful completion of the module, students are expected to attain the following competences:

Presentation skills
Participation in scientific discourse
Absorption of recent research in mechanism design
Acquisition of a reading routine

Schedule

Seminar
Seminar	08.09.21 – 08.12.21	Wednesday	10:15 – 11:45	L7, 3–5, Room P043

E866: Research Seminar in Economic Policy (3rd & 4th year)

Lecturer(s)

Hans Peter Grüner

Course Type: elective course

Course Number: E859

Credits: 7.5

Prerequisites

Prerequisites: E700-E703, E801-E806

Requirements for the assignment of ECTS-Credits and Grades: written exam (90 minutes)

Course Content

Goals and Contents of the module:

The Role of institutions in economic policymaking/Ordnungspolitik
    Overview of the course
    Game theory: a short introduction
    Mechanism Design
        Basic setup
        The revelation principle in dominant strategies
        The Gibbard Satterthwaite theorem
        Bayesian implementation/the revelation principle
    Quasilinear environments
        VCG mechanisms
        AGV mechanisms
        Participation constraints
        The Myerson Satterthwaite theorem
        Robust possibility theorems
        Auctions
        Optimal mechanisms
        Robust mechanism design
    Preference aggregation
        Theory
        Experimental evidence
    Information aggregation in committees
        Theory
        Experimental evidence
    Financing public goods
        Theory
        Experimental evidence
    Mechanisms for fiscal stability
    Economic policy and credit markets
    Mechanisms for monetary policy

Competences acquired

Students learn about theories of information aggregation in institutions. They learn to apply them to practical problems.

Schedule

Lecture
Lecture	06.09.21 – 06.12.21	Monday	15:00 – 17:15	L7, 3–5, Room S031

E873: Research Seminar in Public Economics (3rd & 4th year)

Lecturer(s)

Hans Peter Grüner

Course Type: elective course

Course Number: E866

Credits: 5

Prerequisites

E700-E703, E801-E806

Grading: At least one presentation. Students who wish to obtain ECTS credits should sign up for the course, students who do not wish to obtain credits should not sign up for the course.

Course Content

Students present and discuss policy related economic research.

Competences acquired

Students learn to apply economic theory and quantitative methods to policy problems.

Further information: Students who would like to participate should contact Hans Grüner before the beginning of the semester

Contact Information: Prof. Dr. Grüner, Phone: (0621) 181-1886, email: gruener@uni-mannheim.de, Office: L7, 3–5, room 2–06

Schedule

Seminar
Seminar	06.09.21 – 06.09.21	Monday	17:20 – 18:50	online (access via Portal2)
Seminar	13.09.21 – 06.12.21	Monday	17:20 – 18:50	L7, 3–5 Room 157

E877: Behavioral Game Theory (and Experiments) (2nd year)

Lecturer(s)

Eckhard Janeba

Sebastian Siegloch

Course Type: elective course

Course Number: E873

Credits: 5

Prerequisites

E700-E703, E801-E806

Course Content

Goals and Contents of the module:
Presentation and discussion of current research in public economics (external and internal speakers)

Requirements for the assignment of ECTS-Credits and Grades: Oral presentation of own reserach, contribution to discussion of other perticipants' reserach; only pass/ fail.

Competences acquired

Improve presentations skills, obtain feedback to improve research paper.

Schedule

Seminar
Seminar	07.09.21 – 07.12.21	Tuesday, every two weeks	12:00 – 13:30	L7, 3–5, Room 001 and online (access via Portal2)

4 ECTS

Lecturer(s)

Jörg Oechssler

Course Type: elective course

Course Number: E877

Credits: 4

Prerequisites

Prerequisites: First year courses

Course Content

The course introduces the recent literature on behavioural game theory and learning:

Information Cascades

Quantal- response equilibrium

Level- k theories

Fictious Play

Reinforcement Learning

Experience weighted attraction learning

Imitation

Grading and assignment of ECTS credits

Written exam (90 min)

Literature
Fudenberg, D. and D. Levine (1998) “The Theory of Learning in Games”, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT- Press

Colin Camerer (2003) “Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction”, Princeton University Press

Competences acquired

Expected competences acquired after completion of the module: Students should be able to read and understand the literature on learning in games. They should acquire several necessary theoretical and experimental tools that can be a starting point for independent Ph.D.

Schedule

Lecture
Lecture	12.10.21 – 07.12.21	Tuesday	13:45 – 15:15	L9, 1–2, Room 003

E878: Advanced PhD Seminar in Experimental Economics (3rd & 4th year)

E883: Topics and Projects in Experimental Economics (2nd year)

Lecturer(s)

Henrik Orzen

Course Type: elective course

Course Number: E878

Credits: 5

Prerequisites

E700- E703, E801- E806

Grading and assignment of ECTS credits:

Presentation and active participation

Course Content

In this seminar participants present and discuss their current research as well as ideas for future research. An important goal of the seminar is to provide a forum for students working on projects that use experimental methods or relate to themes in behavioral economics.

Further information

If you are interested in the seminar, please contact Henrik Orzen.

Schedule

Seminar
Seminar	08.09.21 – 08.12.21	Wednesday	13:45 – 15:15	L9, 1–2 Room 002

10 ECTS

Lecturer(s)

Henrik Orzen

Wladislaw Mill

Course Type: elective course

Course Number: E883

Credits: 10

Prerequisites

Prerequisites: E700-E703, E801-E806

Grading and ECTS credits: Presence and participation in discussion and presentation of own research. Writing a research proposal. Grades are assigned on a pass/non-pass basis.

Course Content

This module is intended to introduce students to current topics in Experimental and Behavioral Economics and to familiarize them with recent advances in the eld. The course will be delivered via a mix of lectures, joint readings of papers, in-class discussions, and project work. The lectures will provide introductions to various topics and give relevant background information. Selected papers from the recent relevant literature will be discussed in depth. For this to work all participants will have to read these papers in advance. Over the course of the semester each student is expected to lead the in-class discussion of two of the papers. The module will also provide a forum for students to discuss research ideas and preliminary work. In fact, students are expected to develop a research project of their own and present their advances, experimental design or data. This can be done individually or in pairs.

Competences acquired

On completion of the module students will have gained insights into recent topics of research in experimental and behavioral economics. They will have improved their ability to present – in a clear and structured manner- their own research ideas. They will have gained practice in adequately and constructively criticizing research ideas and their implementation, and they will have acquired advanced skills in communication and team work. They will have developed an improved sense of recognizing the potentials of a research idea.
Further information: Please refer to the syllabus of this course for further information, in particular on the required presentations in week two of the semester.

Schedule

Lecture
Lecture	10.09.21 – 10.12.21	Friday	13:45 – 17:00	Palace, East Wing O 148

RES (Bridge Course): Women in Leadership